To state that this blogger has more than a healthy respect – and out-sized appreciation – for the engineering prowess of Israeli techies is hardly an overstatement. Not only is she in awe of their technological marvels, but she understands all too well what it takes for them (intellectual-wise) to get from there to here. And as a parent of two electrical engineering sons, well, it more than warms the heart. Awesome feats of ‘magic’.
That being said, it is imperative to take a step back from admiring their incontestable (even garnering grudging praise from those who wish Israel nothing but ill will), incredible genius and place it in proper perspective. Immediately.
So, spend a little time looking on in wonderment and don’t forget to thank G-d for their abilities. But do make sure to keep your eyes focused on the inherent limitations of missile defense, especially as an antidote to the real deal – VICTORY!
In other words, there are two core components to Israel’s sustained viability and eventual survival, and they are not mutually exclusive. To be sure, the leadership’s goal should always be victory, however, this is not on the foreseeable horizon. Tragically, there is more than enough demonstrable support to back this claim up :
As is their natural inclination, spineless leaders always revert true to form – adinakutnicki.com/2012/11/23/spineless-leaders-always-revert-true-to-formthey-cave-and-israels-leaders-are-its-poster-boys-addendum-to-israels-ship-of-fools-led-by-delusional-leadership-commentary-by-adina-kutnicki/ – they cave!
And to Israel’s grave misfortune, she is led by a ship of fools – adinakutnicki.com/2012/07/15/israels-ship-of-fools-led-by-delusional-leadership-caroline-glick-skewers-them-barack-hussein-obama-too-commentary-by-adina-kutnicki-11/.
Most ominously, Professor Louis Rene Beres has proven – again and again – how Israel’s leaders have failed to conduct their most intrinsic due diligence; in the life and death realm of protecting the citizens from the most immediate of all threats – a nuclear armed Hitlerite regime.
As is said, the proof is in the (lack of strategic) pudding:
And no one understands Iran’s genocidal project better than Professor Louis Rene Beres – adinakutnicki.com/2012/11/15/irans-wmd-genocidal-project-oxford-university-press-highlights-professor-louis-rene-beres-my-mentor-the-legal-basis-for-pre-emption-commentary-by-adina-kutnicki/….as he looks back at constant error, demystifying the tangled narrative of the Mid East’s hell fire – adinakutnicki.com/2012/09/27/looking-back-at-constant-error-understanding-the-tangled-narrative-of-middle-east-peace-professor-louis-beress-policy-paper-israel-journal-of-foreign-affairs-no-commentary-warranted-adi/….he also offers non-paralleled wisdom re nuclear warfare doctrine – adinakutnicki.com/2012/09/06/professor-louis-beres-his-non-paralleled-wisdom-re-nuclear-warfare-doctrine-addendum-to-two-ways-israel-can-deter-a-nuclear-iran-commentary-by-adina-kutnicki/ – but Israel’s leaders have to be up to the task.
Alas, there are two distinctive ways that Israel can deter a nuclear Iran – adinakutnicki.com/2012/08/16/two-ways-israel-can-deter-a-nuclear-iran-by-professor-louis-beres-my-mentor-decision-time-is-imminent/ – but it didn’t have to be this way…if only they had aimed for VICTORY!
Nevertheless, the patient Professor is still offering his sage advice, but it remains to be seen if Israel’s leaders have all but surrendered.
‘Israel, Iran and Iran Dome, Jerusalem Post’
December 2, 2012
Professor Louis Rene Beres – en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis_Ren%C3%A9_Beres
| “In the aftermath of Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defense, considerable credit is being heaped upon Iron Dome. Technically, of course, such praise is warranted. Without a timely deployment of this advanced system of active defense, innocent Israeli populations could have suffered substantially greater harms.What is not warranted, however, is a reflexive or visceral extrapolation from Pillar of Defense to the emerging nuclear threat from Iran. The threats are very different. This is because any system of active defense will inevitably have “leakage.” This includes Iron Dome but also Arrow, the longer-range Israeli shield that would ultimately need to function against incoming Iranian missiles.Although a less than 100% reliability of interception may be more-or-less acceptable in the face of shorter-range and exclusively conventional explosive rockets launched from Gaza, this less-than-total level of reliability could not be tolerable in the event of any WMD (chemical, biological, or nuclear) missile attack from Iran. |
Plainly, in the very worst-case scenario of an Iranian long-range rocket attack bearing nuclear warheads, not even a single incoming missile could be allowed to reach its Israeli target. Yet, for the moment, at least, no conceivable system of active defense could assure such a conspicuously perfect level of protection.
For Israel, the core inference of this strategic limitation is the lack of wisdom in relying too heavily upon narrow technological solutions. Iron Dome, Arrow and the still in development, David’s Sling (aka Magic Wand), can contribute mightily to Israel’s defense and deterrence postures. But this contribution is less than a true panacea. Moreover, no system of missile defense could be of any use against Iran-assisted acts of nuclear terrorism.
Even after Pillar of Defense, Israel’s remaining strategic options against a steadily nuclear-powered Iran must include preemption, or an expectedly unavoidable last-resort to defensive first strikes. Under relevant international law, if the nuclear danger posed by Iran were potentially existential, and also “imminent in point of time,” these Israeli strikes could be appropriately justified as “anticipatory self-defense.” Any such justification, going back to an 1837 case known in jurisprudence as “The Caroline,” would be authoritatively consistent with customary international law.
These binding rules are identified at Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Moreover, this critical consistency could be enlarged by Iran’s ongoing and unhidden disregard for the Genocide Convention (1948), a foundational multilateral treaty that prohibits not only actual crimes against humanity, but also “conspiracy to commit genocide.”
To be sure, because the human and material costs to Israel of any preemption against Iran would now be staggering, this option could only be rational in those cases where intelligence had reliably revealed an impending Iranian nuclear aggression.
In the final analysis, the correct strategic lesson to be drawn from Iron Dome’s technical success, and also from the inherent limitations of all active defenses, is multi-faceted. Above all, Israel must prepare to do everything possible to deter an already-nuclear Iran, even if that country’s core decision-makers were not expected to meet the standard tests of rationality in world politics. Here, even an Iranian leadership that would value certain religious preferences more highly than national survival could still be dissuaded from launching nuclear first-strikes against Israel. This would be accomplished by posing suitable threats to certain principal Iranian religious institutions and infrastructures.
More likely, however, the leaders of a nuclear Iran would remain subject to the usual threats of deterrence, threats based upon presumptions of rationality. With this in mind, Israel’s task will also be to assure these leaders that any Iranian excursions into nuclear violence would unhesitatingly elicit at least parallel forms of nuclear reprisal. In this connection, it would be important to assure the Iranians that (1) Israel’s nuclear weapons were not “merely” counterforce targeted; (2) these nuclear weapons were effectively invulnerable to enemy first-strikes; and (3) these weapons were fully capable of penetrating Iran’s own active defenses.
To succeed with such assurances, Israel would have to take early steps at ending its longstanding posture ofdeliberate nuclear ambiguity, steps designed to begin to take the Israeli bomb out of the so-called “basement.” By implementing very selective and partial moves toward nuclear disclosure, Israel could significantly enhance the credibility of its nuclear deterrence posture. Although counter-intuitive, the reason and rationality of any such implementation would be dictated by the primal need to convince Iran that Israel’s weapons were both available and usable. Ironically, if Iran were to believe that Israel’s nuclear weapons were “too large” or “too destructive,” they might then become less subject to Israeli nuclear deterrence.
All of these essential enhancements of Israeli nuclear deterrence would have to be accompanied by apt forms of cyber-defense or cyber-war. There might also be some residual strategic benefit to Israel in exploring any still-remaining chances for regime change in Tehran. But this path could quickly prove to be a double-edged sword. There would be no assurances that any Iranian successor regime would necessarily turn out to be less Jihadist, or more inclined to peace with Israel. For this successor regime, authentic diplomacy and negotiations could still be anathema.
Israel needs to continue with its impressive progress on diverse active defenses, especially Iron Dome, Arrow, and David’s Sling. Under certain foreseeable circumstances, Israel could sometime be facing simultaneous rocket attacks from both assorted terror groups (Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon), and belligerent states (Iran). With regard to any contemplated Iranian nuclear strike, Arrow’s main function would not be limited to physical protection of otherwise unprotected Israeli noncombatants. Rather, where it is deployed to protect Israel’s own “hard” nuclear targets, its corollary purpose would be to convince Iran that it can never hope to prevent an unacceptably destructive Israeli nuclear retaliation.
Taken together with improved nuclear deterrence and cyber-defense, Israel’s active defenses represent an utterly indispensable component of the country’s national security doctrine. Considered only by themselves, however, no matter how advanced and technically sophisticated, these defenses can never suffice.”
Again, to our techies: take a well deserved bow. And most especially to our (often delusional) leaders: do not dare to gamble the fate of our nation (half of world Jewry!) on missile defense systems. Although more than worth their weight in gold they can never be leak-proof. They are adjunct therapies. Nothing more, nothing less.
And that, dear readers, is the upshot. It only takes a tiny leak to pierce through all the layers, of even the best missile defense systems in the world. And that leakage will be enough to make the difference between an Israel which will survive or perish.
With Israel tinier than the size of NJ (or even Lake Michigan), would anyone in their sane mind stake their lives on such odds for survival?
NOT this blogger. And she doesn’t have to be a genius to go from there to here!
Adina Kutnicki 
frankly I don’t think it’s such a good idea to end ambiguity on nuclear arms on the side of Israel. it won’t change the behavior of Iran and prompt direct attacks by “international community”. Israel can do without.